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Abstract 
 
In this paper, I introduce a problem to the philosophy of religion – the problem of 
divine moral standing – and explain how this problem is distinct from (albeit related 
to) the more familiar problem of evil (with which it is often conflated).  In short, the 
problem is this: in virtue of how God would be (or, on some given conception, is) 
“involved in” our actions, how is it that God has the moral standing to blame us for 
performing those very actions?  In light of the recent literature on “moral standing”, 
I consider God’s moral standing to blame on two models of “divine providence”: 
open theism, and theological determinism.  I contend that God may have standing 
on open theism, and – perhaps surprisingly – may also have standing, even on 
theological determinism, given the truth of compatibilism.  The topic of this paper 
thus sheds considerable light on the traditional philosophical debate about the 
conditions of moral responsibility.   
 
The history of the relationship between theistic belief and moral responsibility is both long 
and complex.  In the theistic context, perhaps the central problem regarding human moral 
responsibility has been this: how does God’s control over what happens leave room for the 
sort of creaturely control necessary for moral responsibility?  A central challenge for 
traditional theists has thus always been to articulate and defend an account of God’s causal 
control over the world that respects and preserves human responsibility.  Such theories 
divide according to familiar lines; broadly speaking, incompatibilists about responsibility and 
determinism have endorsed “open theism” or “Molinism”, whereas compatibilists have 
endorsed what might be called “theological determinism”.  And, broadly speaking, the 
former accuse the latter of eliminating creaturely responsibility; the latter accuse the former 
of eliminating divine sovereignty.  Such is the familiar dialectic.  
 According to the major theistic religions, however, God does not simply make us 
responsible; God furthermore holds us responsible.  But the claim that God holds us 
responsible raises substantial new difficulties beyond those entailed by the claim that God 
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makes us responsible.  In particular, from the mere fact that a given agent is blameworthy, it 
does not follow that just any further agent is well-positioned morally to blame her.  
Accordingly, from the mere fact that God has made us responsible, it does not follow that 
God is well-positioned morally to hold us responsible.  In the terminology employed in a 
recent (and growing) literature, even if we are blameworthy, it doesn’t follow that God has 
the moral standing to blame.  After all, God would seem to be intimately involved in our 
wrongdoing.  And even if God’s involvement in our wrongdoing indeed leaves us 
responsible, it may nevertheless imply that God lacks the moral standing to criticize that very 
wrongdoing.  In sum: even if we are blameworthy, we may nevertheless be able appropriately 
to say to God, “Who are you to blame me?”  
 The first goal of this paper is therefore to motivate a new problem within the 
philosophy of religion: the problem of divine moral standing.  I say that this is a “new” 
problem, not because no philosophers or theologians have previously addressed the problem 
at issue; as we’ll see shortly, many have, at least indirectly.1  I say that the problem is “new” 
because, as I also hope to show, the problem has not received the detailed and careful 
articulation it would seem to deserve. In particular, the problem of God’s standing is often 
conflated with a related problem with which it is nevertheless importantly distinct: the 
problem of evil. As I aim to bring out, however, it is conceptually possible that whereas God 
is morally perfect (and so the problem of evil is solved), nevertheless God lacks standing; 
and it is furthermore conceptually possible that whereas the person at issue is not morally 
perfect (and so is not “God”), this person nevertheless has standing.  Given these 
distinctions, we must be clear: are we challenging (or defending) God’s perfection – or instead 
God’s standing?    
 The second goal of this paper is to address the question it means to raise: does God 
have the moral standing to blame?  My answer is as follows: So long as God gives us free 
will, then God will have the standing to blame.  (Whether, given certain other salient facts, 																																																								
1 After this paper was accepted, however, I learned of Churchill’s paper, “Determinism and Divine 
Blame,” which is (as of my current writing) forthcoming in Faith and Philosophy.  Churchill’s paper – 
which I hope to interact with in future work – also takes up the question of the divine moral standing 
to blame.  
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God could be perfect is, however, another matter – and one I won’t address.) In particular, I 
consider two “models of providence” at opposite ends of the theological spectrum – open 
theism, and theological determinism – and assess whether, on those models, God has the 
standing to blame God’s creatures when those creatures do wrong.  (I will assume that, if 
God has standing even on theological determinism, God will also have standing on [the 
intermediate position] Molinism.2) Perhaps surprisingly, I contend that, in both cases, the 
answer is Yes.  On open theist assumptions, I shall argue, and as I suspect many will grant, 
there is no clear reason why God should lack the standing to blame.  The case of theological 
determinism, however, is substantially more difficult.  In the bulk of the paper, then, I argue 
that, given compatibilism, the God of theological determinism indeed will have the standing to 
blame. Accordingly, if you want to maintain that God could not possibly appropriately 
blame those God determines, then you will have to abandon compatibilism.  The project of 
this paper, as I hope will become clear, thus has substantial implications for the traditional 
debate about the conditions of moral responsibility.   
 The plan of the paper is as follows.  First, I take up the question: what are the 
conditions on having the “standing to blame”?  The contemporary discussion of “moral 
standing” was arguably inaugurated by G.A. Cohen’s important paper, “Casting the First 
Stone: who can, and who can’t, condemn the terrorists?”, and this is where I begin my 
discussion. Cohen proposes two conditions on having “moral standing”: a non-hypocrisy 
condition, and – more importantly, for our purposes – a non-involvement condition.  With 
these conditions on the table, we will then be in position to ask how they apply (or fail to 
																																																								
2 And any yet further intermediary positions besides, e.g. what Kvanvig (Destiny and Deliberation, xiii) 
calls the “Arminianism” developed in his Destiny and Deliberation (Chapters 4 - 8). 
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apply) to God.3  We will also be in position to make a sharp distinction between the question 
of God’s standing and the question of God’s perfection (and some related questions besides).  I 
go on to contend that, on reflection, Cohen’s two conditions in fact reduce to a single 
condition of moral commitment.  The question whether God has standing, then, becomes the 
question whether, despite God’s providential activities, God can plausibly still be morally 
committed to the values that would condemn what we do.  I then turn to assess the pictures 
of God associated with open theism and theological determinism, and consider whether 
God has the moral standing to blame, so construed, on those pictures.   
  
 Cohen on Hypocrisy and Involvement  
 
Cohen’s paper is one of the first to explicitly focus on the issues here at stake, and is worth 
quoting at length.  He introduces the relevant topic as follows: 
 
We can distinguish three ways in which a person may seek to silence, or to blunt the 
edge of, a critic’s condemnation.  First, she may seek to show that she did not, in 
fact, perform the action under criticism. Second, and without denying that she 
performed that action, she may claim that the action does not warrant moral 
condemnation, because there was an adequate justification for it, or at least a 
legitimate excuse for performing it.  Third, while not denying that the action was 
performed, and that it is to be condemned (which is not to say: while agreeing that it is 
to be condemned), she can seek to discredit her critic’s assertion of her standing as a 
good faith condemner of the relevant action.4 																																																								
3 I first discussed Cohen’s account of moral standing in my “Manipulation and Moral Standing,” and 
have further discussed it in my “A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame.”  Some of the 
material in the next two sections is borrowed from these two papers.  In effect, in the next two 
sections, I quickly explain one of the main results defended in “A Unified Account of the Moral 
Standing to Blame”.  The overarching point of this paper is to apply this result to the case of God.  
However, in order to apply this result, I first must repeat some aspects of it here.   
4 Cohen, “Casting the First Stone,” 119.  
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It is this third way of responding to a critic’s blame that Cohen is interested in, and here he 
identifies two different versions of such a response:    
 
The first of these techniques for compromising a critic’s voice was signalled in my 
childhood by the retort ‘Look who’s talking!’ Shapiro might say, ‘Hey, Goldstein, 
how come you didn’t come to the club last night? All the guys were expecting you.’ 
And Goldstein might reply: ‘Look who’s talking. Twice last week, you didn’t show up.’ 
Unless Shapiro could now point to some relevant difference, his power to condemn 
was compromised, whether or not the criticism he originally made of Goldstein was 
sound.5  
 
For that first type of would-be discrediting response I have three good labels: ‘look 
who’s talking’, ‘pot calling the kettle black’, and ‘tu quoque’. For my contrasting 
second type I have no good vernacular or Latin tag. But I will point you in the right 
direction by reminding you of retorts to criticism like ‘you made me do it’, and ‘you 
started it’, even though those phrases don’t cover all the variants of the second type. 
I shall name the second type ‘You’re involved in it yourself’, but if anybody can think 
of a better name, then suggestions are welcome.6  
 
Cohen, then, explicitly contrasts the “non-involvement” condition with the “non-hypocrisy” 
																																																								
5 Cohen, “Casting the First Stone,” 121-122.   
6 Cohen, “Casting the First Stone,” 123. 
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condition.7 He goes on:  
 
In this second type of silencing response you are disabled from condemning me not 
because you are responsible for something similar or worse yourself but because you 
bear at least some responsibility for the very thing that you seek to criticize. My Nazi 
superior cannot condemn me for doing what he orders me on pain of death to do, 
even if I should disobey, and accept death.8  
 
Note: Cohen here puts his point in terms of responsibility.  The idea seems to be that if you 
are responsible for someone’s wrongdoing, you cannot criticize that wrongdoing.  He elaborates 
as follows:  
 
I said earlier that among the variants of this second way of deflecting criticism … are 
‘You started it’ and ‘You made me do it’: the reply has many variants, with ‘It’s your 
fault that I did it’ at one kind of extreme and ‘You helped me to do it’ at another. 
And note that if it’s your fault, in whole or in part, that I did it, then it can be your 
fault for structurally different reasons. Here’s part of the relevant wide array: you 
ordered me to do it, you asked me to do it, you forced me to do it, you left me with 
no reasonable alternative, you gave me the means to do it (perhaps by selling me the 
arms that I needed). When such responses from a criticized agent are in place, they 																																																								
7 This contrast also appears in a series of recent papers (Tadros, “Poverty and Criminal 
Responsibility,” Duff, “Blame, Moral Standing and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Trial,” and 
Watson, “A Moral Predicament in the Criminal Law”) regarding a “moral predicament in the 
criminal law” (to use the title of Watson’s paper). The topic of these papers is importantly parallel to 
the issues I consider here.  For these authors, the question is whether the state is morally permitted to 
hold certain wrongdoers criminally responsible for their crimes, when the state is (arguably) complicit 
in (or otherwise partially responsible for) those very crimes.  Precisely how tight the analogy is to 
God’s holding us responsible (given a certain model of providence) is a question I will not pursue.  
8 Cohen, “Casting the First Stone,” 124.  
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compromise criticism that comes from the now impugned critic, while leaving third 
parties entirely free to criticize that agent.9  
 
Finally, Cohen writes: 
 
The general form of ‘You’re involved in it yourself’ is this: you are implicated in the 
commission of this very act, as its co-responsible stimulus, commander, coercer, 
guard, assistant, or whatever (whether or not what you did was wrong, or similar to 
what I did, or worse than what I did).10  
 
So much for Cohen’s two conditions.  Now we can begin to ask: how might these 
conditions apply to God?  As a first approximation: the charge of involvement certainly 
seems more promising – and more relevant – than the charge of hypocrisy. If God blames 
me for stealing a bicycle, it seems doubtful that I could reply that God himself has stolen 
bicycles, so had better keep quiet. The charge of involvement, however, seems more 
pressing.  For on any conception of God, there will be a sense in which God gave me the 
“means” to steal the bicycle, and on any conception of God, God was in position to prevent 
my stealing the bicycle, and yet did not – and so is, to that extent, responsible for the fact 
that I did end up stealing it.  And on some conceptions of God (to be discussed shortly), God 
is himself responsible for my stealing the bicycle, precisely on grounds that – in some sense 
– God himself caused me to do so (along with everything else).  And so whereas it is 
doubtful that I could object to God’s blame on grounds that God has done something 
similar himself, it does seem that I may be able to object on grounds that God is himself 
responsible for the very thing he is condemning.  This is the problem of the divine moral 
standing to blame.  
I will return to the conditions on “moral standing” as proposed by Cohen shortly.  
At this stage, however, it is crucial to see how the problem of divine standing is distinct from 
– albeit related to – the more familiar problem of evil.  We can bring out the distinction as 
follows.  Suppose that there is, in fact, an omnipotent, omniscient creator of the universe.  																																																								
9 Cohen, “Casting the First Stone,” 126.  
10 Cohen, “Casting the First Stone, 127.  
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The problem of evil, in short, is this: in view of the facts of evil, how could any such creator 
nevertheless be morally perfect? If we hold fixed omnipotence and omniscience, then we’ll 
have to forego moral perfection.  (And if it is essential to being “God” that one is morally 
perfect, we’ll have to say that any such creator is not, in fact, God.) But the problem of 
divine standing is distinct from this problem.  The problem of standing is this: in view of 
how such a creator would be (or, on some given conception, is) involved in our actions, how 
could that creator nevertheless have the standing to blame us?  And here we must make two 
points.  First, some will contend that even if the problem of evil is solved, so that the given 
creator is, in fact, morally perfect, nevertheless that creator could lack the standing to blame. 
And, second, even if such a creator has the standing to blame, it doesn’t follow that this creator 
in fact must be perfect. The two problems are, in this way, distinct.   
 Consider the former claim first.  And recall Cohen’s articulation of the “general 
form” of the “you’re involved in it yourself” response to the critic:  
 
You are implicated in the commission of this very act, as its co-responsible stimulus, 
commander, coercer, guard, assistant, or whatever (whether or not what you did was 
wrong, or similar to what I did, or worse than what I did). 
 
From this passage, it can seem that Cohen endorses the possibility of what we might call no-
fault loss of standing.  Because you are implicated in the commission of this very act, you can’t 
blame me – whether or not what you did was wrong. For Cohen, then, it would appear that the 
“you’re involved in it yourself” response does not turn on a claim of wrongful or criticizable 
involvement.  One’s involvement might remove one’s standing to blame, even if that 
involvement was itself faultless or blameless.  We might put the point like this.  For Cohen, 
one’s involvement in (and responsibility for) someone else’s wrongdoing may be blameless – 
but it may nevertheless leave a sort of “moral residue”, which residue implies that one is 
morally disabled from criticizing that wrongdoing, even if that wrongdoing objectively 
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deserves criticism.11 But on such a conception of moral standing, it would not follow simply 
from God’s being perfect that God would thereby have standing.  God’s providential activities 
in governing the world may be perfectly upstanding, and perfectly blameless, and yet 
nevertheless, in virtue of those activities, God may lack the standing to blame.  Presumably, 
then, Cohen (and those like him) would not be content, concerning God’s standing to 
criticize us, merely with a defense of the claim that God’s involvement was blameless. That, 
they may say, isn’t the point.  Their point isn’t that God did something wrong.  Their point 
is that, whether or not God did something wrong, God is involved, and so God is in no 
position to blame.   
 Whether there can be “no fault” loss of standing is of central importance concerning 
whether God could have the standing to blame; I turn briefly to this question shortly.  
Consider first, however, the second point noted above – the point that the relevant creator 
might have standing even if that creator isn’t perfect.  Theists, of course, would regard it as a 
pyrrhic victory if they could successfully defend God’s standing, but not God’s perfection.  
At the same time, it will be an important conceptual point in what follows that the creator 
needn’t be perfect in order to have standing to blame. (After all, none of us are perfect, but 
presumably some of us do have standing.12) We will consider, in turn, various challenges to 
God’s standing, and it is crucial to see that the resources needed to defend God’s standing 
																																																								
11 Matt King, in a recent paper (“Manipulation Arguments and the Moral Standing to Blame”), 
explicitly defends this conception of moral standing and the “involvement” condition. Lippert-
Rasmussen (“Who Can I Blame?”, 299) seems open to the possibility as well. For an interesting 
discussion of the concept of “moral residue” (albeit in a different context than the one at issue here), 
see Stump, “Personal relations and moral residue.”  
12 Of course, this claim might be challenged; in fact, this claim was seemingly challenged by Jesus in 
the famous episode of the woman caught in adultery.  Here Jesus says: “He who is without sin may 
cast the first stone”, not “He who has not committed adultery may cast the first stone.” If the idea 
here is that only the sinless are in position to condemn, then the implication is that none of us are in 
position to condemn. Readers may make of this suggestion what they will.  
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are different from (and more minimal than) those needed to defend God’s perfection. The 
questions are simply different questions, and the issues different issues.   
 
Against “no fault” loss of standing – and towards a unified account   
 
Here, I turn to the question raised above: can there be “no fault” loss of standing? I certainly 
cannot claim fully to resolve this question here. I contend, however, that the cases to which 
Cohen points do not adequately support this possibility.13     
Recall that it is crucial to the phenomenon under consideration that it may apply, even 
if we grant that the relevant target is morally responsible.  That is, what we’re interested in is 
the conditions under which one lacks standing to blame someone who is in fact a morally 
responsible wrongdoer. However, I contend that, when we investigate Cohen’s imagined 
“wide array” of responses more carefully, they work in either one of two ways: first, by 
indicating that the involvement took away (or at least diminished) the target’s freedom, and 
therefore also his moral responsibility, or second, by indicating something about the would-
be blamer’s commitment to the relevant values.  In neither case, however, is mere 
involvement doing the work to undermine one’s standing to blame someone who is in fact 
morally responsible.  More particularly, if one’s “involvement” implies one’s lack of 
standing, this is because, at a minimum, it implies a fault.  
 To explain.  Consider, first, “You forced me to do it.” It is, in a sense, easy to see 
how “You forced me to do it” might disable criticism: insofar as one was forced to do what 
one does, one isn’t responsible. Similar remarks apply to “You made me do it”, “You 
coerced me into doing it,” and “You left me with no reasonable alternative.” If your 
involvement in my coming to do something left me with no reasonable alternative to doing 
it, then your involvement seemingly took away my freedom with respect to doing it; instead, 
I was forced, and so not responsible.  However, insofar as one’s response to a critic serves to 
indicate that one is not even responsible, we do not here have an instance of the kind of 
																																																								
13 Again, I more fully develop these points in Todd, “A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to 
Blame,” and some of the material in this section is borrowed from Todd, “Manipulation and Moral 
Standing,” and Todd, “A Unified Account”.     
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response at issue – one that explicitly does not deny one’s responsibility. In short, the “reply” 
to God we are considering in this paper is not “You made me to do it, so I’m not 
responsible,” but instead, “Even if I’m responsible, you can’t blame me.”  
However, if the response does not work by indicating one’s non-responsibility, I 
claim, then it works only by indicating something further about the blamer – beyond the 
blamer’s mere responsibility for what one does.  To see this point, we must consider Cohen’s 
other examples: 
 
- You helped me to do it. 
- You asked me to do it.  
- You gave me the means to do it.  
- You commanded me to do it.  
 
Crucially, I contend that, in all of these cases, there are ways in which one might have done 
the thing in question, and thereby be responsible (even morally responsible) for what the given 
person does, and yet one’s standing to blame her remains intact.  Such cases all display a 
similar structure – a structure we can bring out by considering Cohen’s case of the Nazi 
commander.  
Now, Cohen certainly seems right that the typical Nazi commander lacks the 
standing to blame his soldiers for faithfully following his orders, even if such orders should 
be disobeyed.   Importantly, however, what accounts for this fact is not merely that the 
commander is (morally) responsible for what his soldiers do when following his orders.  
Rather, this is because, for the typical commander, any criticism he might direct towards his 
soldiers for faithfully following his commands would have to be – in a sense to be explained 
– “hypocritical”.  Consider the case of Steffen: 
 
Steffen is a typical Nazi commander working in a death camp.  He hears rumors of 
an escape attempt.  Thus, he orders Thomas to investigate the fence and sound the 
alarm, should he see any prisoners escaping.  Thomas sees the prisoners, sounds the 
alarm, and the prisoners are caught and executed.  Now, Thomas should have let the 
prisoners go; he should have had mercy and simply reported back to Steffen that 
there was nothing to the rumors.  But he doesn’t.   
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In this case, of course, Steffen lacks the standing to blame Thomas for sounding the alarm.  
Indeed, absent further details, the case can seem unintelligible: why would Steffen – a typical 
Nazi commander, and someone who presumably endorses actions such as Thomas’ – be 
blaming Thomas for what he does?   
Consider Jonas, however:  
 
Jonas is a Nazi commander working in a death camp.  However, unlike Steffen, 
Jonas is secretly opposed to the Nazi regime.  He thus does everything within his 
power to save the lives of as many prisoners as possible, consistent, of course, with 
maintaining his position as a committed Nazi; Jonas (correctly) reasons that he can 
do much more good secretly sabotaging the Nazi efforts as a trusted commander 
than he could by open defiance.  Jonas hears rumors of an escape.  In order to keep 
appearances, he must order someone to investigate the fence.  Jonas thus orders 
Thomas to investigate the fence and sound the alarm should he see anyone 
attempting escape.  Jonas chose Thomas for this task because he (blamelessly, 
though incorrectly) thought that, of all the people he might choose, Thomas would 
be the most likely to have mercy and not sound the alarm should he actually find 
prisoners escaping, and instead report back that there was nothing to the rumors.  
Instead, however, Thomas discovers the escaping prisoners, sounds the alarm, and 
the prisoners are caught and executed.   
 
It seems clear that, in this case, Jonas retains the standing to blame Thomas for sounding the 
alarm.  Hearing the alarm, it seems perfectly appropriate for Jonas to inwardly condemn 
Thomas for not showing mercy.  And later Jonas might confront Thomas about his act.  
Thomas might say, “But you ordered me to do it!” And Jonas might reply: “Yes, I ordered 
you to do it, but that gives you no excuse; you should have disobeyed my orders, even at 
great risk to yourself.”  What, then, makes the difference (in moral standing) between Jonas 
and Steffen?  Well, it is not that whereas Steffen is responsible for what Thomas did, Jonas is 
not.  Jonas is responsible for what Thomas did; anyway, if Steffen is, so is Jonas.  That is, 
both are morally responsible for what Thomas did, at least to the extent that commanders 
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are morally responsible for what their soldiers do when faithfully following their orders.  Yet 
Jonas retains the standing to blame Thomas. 
 Similar cases might be constructed for Cohen’s other imagined responses.  In each 
case, one might be “involved in” (and thereby morally responsible for) the relevant 
wrongdoing in the alleged way, yet retain the standing to blame.  In these cases, we might say 
something like:  
 
- Yes, I helped you to do it – but that was because I had no other choice.  You should 
have refused my help.  
- Yes, I asked you to do it – but that was because […]. You shouldn’t have done what 
I asked. 
- Yes, I gave you the means to do it, but that was because […].  You still shouldn’t 
have done what you did.   
 
The result: if the involvement is faultless, then, very plausibly, it does not, in itself, remove 
one’s standing to blame. It is, at most, only a particular kind of involvement that removes 
standing – a kind that indicates something further.  What, then, is this something further? 
 A natural suggestion is that involvement removes standing only when it indicates a 
lack of commitment to the values that would condemn the wrongdoer’s actions.  (I will not 
attempt fully to analyze the sort of commitment at issue; however, it consists, minimally, in 
endorsement of the value as a genuine value, together with at least some degree of motivation 
oneself to act in accordance with the value.) Consider Steffen.  What is it, exactly, that is so 
problematic about Steffen’s purporting now to blame Thomas for sounding the alarm, after 
having commanded him to do so?  It is, presumably, that the very fact that Steffen 
commanded Thomas to do so is excellent evidence of something, viz., Steffen’s own 
endorsement (or at the very least: non-condemnation) of Thomas’ actions. On being 
confronted by the allies after the war, for instance, Steffen cannot – on pain of the sheerest 
hypocrisy – now turn around and criticize Thomas for what he did, unless, at a minimum, he 
is prepared now also to condemn himself.  Absent some strong indication of such a moral 
transformation, however, Thomas would be entitled to reject Steffen’s criticism as entirely 
hypocritical – as motivated only by an attempt to save his own skin, say, or anyway not by 
concern for the given victims. But note: here the worry turns out to be in the arena of 
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“hypocrisy” – that Steffen’s purported condemnation of Thomas would have to be (in some 
relevant sense) hypocritical, or in bad moral faith.  And now we are back to the non-
hypocrisy condition.  Steffen’s “involvement” in what Thomas did has dropped out. 
  At this stage, then, we may begin to see the fundamental similarity of the two sorts 
of “replies” Cohen identifies – a similarity Cohen’s discussion seems to obscure.  In essence, 
we have two versions of what is fundamentally the same response:  
 
Who are you to blame me?  Your past behavior reveals your own non-commitment to 
the values that would condemn what I did.  
 
Who are you to blame me?  Your involvement in my action reveals your own non-
commitment to the values that would condemn what I did.   
  
What we have here, then, are simply two different sources of evidence of one and the same 
thing.  But it is, plausibly, this one thing that removes standing.  
 At this point, then, we may note the following.  What is important concerning 
someone’s standing is not whether that person is involved in one’s wrongdoing, but what 
that involvement says about that person’s values and moral commitments.  As concerns 
God’s standing to blame, then, the question becomes this: whether, despite God’s 
providential activities, God can plausibly still be morally committed to the values that would 
condemn what we do.  With this in mind, I turn now to assess whether God has the moral 
standing to blame, on open theism, and on theological determinism.  
 
Open Theism  
 
The basic thrust of open theism is as follows.  God is omnipotent, and omniscient, but, 
since incompatibilism is true, and not even God could know in advance the outcome of a 
genuinely indeterministic process, not even God can know in advance what a free agent 
would do in a circumstance in which she is free.  Thus, God’s creative activities are not 
informed by a knowledge of what free agents will do in response to the circumstances God 
creates.  God nevertheless judges that it is worth creating such free agents, but in doing so 
takes a risk – the risk that they will act badly.  And we have, in fact, acted badly. Of course, 
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much more could be said about the “theological” picture motivating open theism.  But the 
following point seems to be in order: open theism, we might say, is a model of providence 
invented precisely in order to secure God’s standing to blame.  First, so long as free will is 
possible to give, then, on open theism, God gives us free will.  And God’s “involvement” in 
our wrong actions is, apparently, limited simply to creating the general circumstances in which 
we act, and not preventing us from acting in those ways.14  Accordingly, the standing of the 
God of open theism is not often challenged.15  In fact, I have been able to locate only one 
such challenge – or something close to it – in the literature.  In a recent essay, Derk 
Pereboom writes:  
 
But even given libertarianism about our free will and Open Theism, such [divine] 
expressions of frustration would often have to be misleading as well.  A study from 
New Zealand released in 2002 indicates that 85 percent of boys who have a 
weakened version of a gene that controls production of an enzyme called 
monoamine oxidase A – which breaks down key neurotransmitters linked with 
mood, aggression, and pleasure – and who were abused turned to criminal or 
antisocial behavior.  Open Theists hold that God could have prevented the genetic 
defect, and could also have prevented the violence.  Wouldn’t God’s expressing 																																																								
14 For an exposition and defense of the open theist model of providence, see especially Hasker, 
Providence, Evil, and the Openness of God, and Geach, Providence and Evil.  For criticism, see, e.g., Kvanvig, 
Destiny and Deliberation Chapter 4. Open theism is also often motivated philosophically simply on 
grounds that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom.  For this sort of defence of 
open theism, see Prior, “The Formalities of Omniscience,” Lucas, The Future, Todd, “Prepunishment 
and Explanatory Dependence,” Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism Chapter 10, and van Inwagen, 
“What does an omniscient being know about the future.”  For further discussion of the problem of 
foreknowledge and freedom, see, e.g., Zagzebski, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge, and Todd 
and Fischer, “Introduction,” (in Fischer and Todd, Freedom, Fatalism, and Foreknowledge).  
15 However, philosophers do sometimes contend (e.g., Flint, Divine Providence, 104 - 105, Kvanvig, 
Destiny and Deliberation, xii) that open theism makes the problem of evil worse.  
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frustration with their behavior also seem somewhat disingenuous?  More generally, 
many people have natural dispositions that incline them to bad behavior, while 
others do not.  Wouldn’t most divine expression of frustration with especially bad 
behavior be suspect, given that God could have created all of us with the best sort of 
dispositions we find among human beings?16  
 
The response to one aspect of Pereboom’s challenge seems clear: God would tailor God’s 
expressions of frustration precisely to the degree that is warranted by the degree of 
blameworthiness in question.  Indeed, this much is guaranteed, one might say, by God’s 
perfect moral goodness, together with God’s omniscience. In this case, then, God will of 
course not express disproportionate frustration with the behavior of the relevant boys.  
However, if the given genetic defect indeed left them to some degree responsible, then God will 
express frustration with them (if he does so) commensurate with that degree.  More simply: 
God is perfectly aware – far more intimately than we are – of what mitigating circumstances 
affect our blameworthiness.  And God takes these circumstances perfectly and precisely into 
account when and if God blames us.  
 Of course, there is another aspect of Pereboom’s challenge, and that is simply that 
God has failed to prevent the relevant instances of wrongdoing.  And how can one 
appropriately express frustration towards what one was in position to prevent but decided 
not to prevent?  More particularly, Pereboom’s discussion suggests the following sort of 
principle:  
 
If one was in position to prevent someone’s morally wrong action, but one 
intentionally does not prevent that person’s action, then one cannot appropriately 
blame that person for performing that action.   
 
But this principle seems false.  Suppose a terrorist credibly threatens Nigel: kill those 5 
people, or I will kill these 20.  Nigel deliberates, and is in position to prevent the terrorist’s 
wrong action of killing the 20.  He doesn’t, on grounds that he has a policy of not giving in 
to this kind of moral blackmail.  But, when the terrorist does in fact kill the 20, Nigel is 																																																								
16 Pereboom, “Libertarianism and Theological Determinism,” 128.  
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certainly in position to blame him for doing so.  (Other examples might be constructed.) The 
point, then, is this: the mere fact that God hasn’t prevented the relevant wrongdoing does not, 
by itself, show that God cannot criticize that wrongdoing.  In particular, that God did not 
prevent the wrongdoing does not, by itself, tell us that God does not condemn this 
wrongdoing. The permission of the wrongdoing may have been reluctant permission.   
 Of course, some will want to say that there is a crucial difference here: whereas Nigel 
was justified in (or had an excuse for) not preventing the terrorist’s wrong action (at least 
according to non-consequentialists), God – some will say – has no excuse for failing to 
prevent our wrong actions.  In particular, if God exists as imagined by open theists, then 
clearly God currently has something like a policy of not preventing all of the wrong actions 
we may perform.  (I do not say that God clearly has a policy of not preventing any such 
actions; perhaps God is indeed, unbeknownst to us, preventing a great deal of wrongdoing 
that would otherwise occur, but for his actions.) However, certain proponents of the 
problem of evil may claim that God is not justified in adopting this sort of policy: God 
should adopt the policy of never allowing anyone ever to perform morally wrong actions.  
But now the point is clear.  Here we are simply considering the problem of evil – or some 
aspect of the problem of evil.  The proponent of this problem may grant that the mere fact 
that God hasn’t prevented the wrongdoing does not imply that God does not condemn this 
wrongdoing; she may admit that God does condemn it, and appropriately so – and even that 
therefore God has “standing”.  Nevertheless, she maintains that God’s decision in this 
regard is in fact morally wrong.  Thus, she contends that, in point of fact, the person we 
have been calling “God” cannot be God – cannot be, inter alia, morally perfect, whether or 
not this person has standing.   
 Whether God could be justified in adopting the policy of not always preventing 
wrongdoing is a question I will not pursue.  I simply note that this is a different question 
than the question whether God has standing.  And, from the considerations adduced so far, 
we have no reason, I believe, to say that God lacks the standing to blame, given open theism.  
At most, what we could claim is that God has mistaken priorities: there is wrongdoing that 
God should prevent but does not prevent.  But not every way of being morally mistaken is a 
way of lacking standing.  (“OK, maybe I’m not perfect, but that doesn’t mean I can’t criticize 
you.”) More particularly, an omnipotent, omniscient creator that leaves agents 
indeterministically-free to evolve “on their own” may have the moral standing to blame 
	 18 
those agents, if they do wrong, even if that creator did something wrong (for instance) in 
creating those creatures (in those conditions) in the first place, or does something wrong in 
failing to intervene more radically in their affairs.  Whether God does do something wrong in 
this way, is, of course, a complicated question, and open theists have certainly tried to 
address it.  But once more, we do not have a clear reason to suppose that the God of open 
theism lacks standing.  
   
Theological Determinism  
 
I turn now to the “model of providence” that makes God’s standing to blame considerably 
more difficult to defend: theological determinism.  Now, theological determinism is 
sometimes defined in different ways, and here we might detain ourselves for some time 
regarding different versions of the view, different versions of “determinism”, and yet more 
besides.  These are difficult matters.17 Heath White, for instance, has recently defined 
theological determinism as follows: 
 
Theological determinism: (i) the facts about God’s will wholly determine every other 
contingent fact, and (ii) the facts about God’s will explain every other contingent 
fact.18  
 
And this is a sensible definition – but it doesn’t, in itself, amount to a deterministic “model 
of providence”.  Here, then, I will have recourse to a familiar analogy often employed in 
these contexts: the analogy of an author and a script.19  On theological determinism, God 
constructs an entire “script” representing a complete universe, and then, well, brings that 																																																								
17 For some of the various complexities regarding “determinism” in this context, see Byerly, The 
Mechanics of Divine Foreknowledge and Providence, 81 – 90.  
18 White, “Theological Determinism and the ‘Authoring Sin’ Objection,” 81.  
19 E.g., Ross, Philosophical Theology, 257 – 269.  White (“Theological Determinism,” 81) also endorses 
the analogy, so long as we keep in mind, as surely we must, that “God does not create 
representations of agents but the real thing.”  
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script to life.  (We might also say that God inspects all of the possible scripts – they are just 
there – and then decides to make one of them actual. I’m indifferent.) The theological 
determinist adds that this script is the best of all – or anyway amongst the best of all – 
possible scripts.  (The idea here, I hope, is familiar.)  Further, and crucially, the theological 
determinist is a compatibilist.20  Accordingly, though God determines the script to unfold “as 
written”, we are, nevertheless, free and responsible.  In short: God writes the script in such a 
way that we meet all of the compatibilist’s conditions on freedom and responsibility. The 
theological determinist thus contends that we are responsible for what we do, despite being 
determined, in this way, by God.    
 Now, if we employ the analogy of author and script, and if we understand “moral 
standing” as we have above, the crucial question is this: what can we gather about the 
character and values of an author by inspection of that author’s story?  And here we must 
insist on the following point: from the mere fact that an author includes some given action 
in a “script”, it does not follow that that author approves of that action (or such actions), 
considered in itself (or themselves). Making this crucial point, Ross writes as follows:  
 
It should be obvious that ‘God wills that Jones stab Smith’ does not entail ‘God 
approves of Jones’ conduct in his act of stabbing Smith’.21   
 
And this opens up the space to see how, on theological determinism, God might 
nevertheless have the moral standing to blame.  Now, no one, as far as I have been able to 
see, has articulated a complaint against theological determinism precisely on grounds that it 
cannot accommodate God’s moral standing to blame.  The author that has, in my opinion, 
come nearest to articulating this problem, however, is William Hasker.22  In his paper, “The 																																																								
20 Derk Pereboom (“Libertarianism and Theological Determinism”), however, defends an 
incompatibilist version of theological determinism, on which we simply aren’t morally responsible (in 
what he calls the “basic desert” sense).   
21 Ross, Philosophical Theology, 263.  
22 Something in the neighbourhood of this problem is often hinted at, but not fully addressed.  For 
instance, Frederick Vivian writes: “The Calvinists and the Jansenists fully realised the contradiction 
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Antinomies of Divine Providence,” Hasker considers two such “antinomies”, the first of 
which is the familiar problem of how God’s control can be consistent with our control, and 
the second of which is the “antinomy of divine planning and pathos”.  Concerning this latter 
antinomy, Hasker writes:  
 
[The antinomy] may be stated as follows: God has a detailed plan for everything that occurs 
in the world, yet God exhibits powerful affective responses to the various things that take place. 
Unlike the antinomy of divine and human control, this antinomy does not even have 
the appearance of a formal contradiction.  Yet there does seem to be at the very least 
a strong incongruity: if everything that happens is in accord with God’s plan, then 
why is God so powerfully affected by these events when they occur?23  
 
On reflection, however, Hasker’s concern is not so much how God could have the moral 
standing to blame, but why it is that God would even blame in the first place.  Nevertheless, in 
considering God’s moral standing on theological determinism, it will be important carefully 
to consider Hasker’s claims.  Hasker writes:  
 
If indeed God has a detailed plan for everything that occurs in the world, and 
everything that takes place is strictly in accord with that plan, then how is it possible 
… to understand [God’s] anger against sin?  … The situation is particularly difficult 
for Augustinianism [theological determinism], for on this view everything that takes place 
is exactly as God wishes it to be; there is no possible world God would prefer to the actual world in 
any respect. If we are told, then, that God has a deep and abiding anger at the 
unrighteousness that takes place on earth, our only possible response is that this 
simply cannot be: to represent God as angry and hostile to situations which are 																																																																																																																																																																					
and were prepared to sacrifice free will, undismayed by the absurdity of making God both Creator 
and Judge.” (Human Freedom and Responsibility, 76) For further reflections “in the neighborhood”, see 
Sommers’ (Relative Justice, 73 – 83) discussion of the Calvinist views of Jonathan Edwards, and Le 
Poidevin, “Autonomous Agents or God’s Automata?”   
23 Hasker, Providence, Evil, and the Openness of God, 158.  
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exactly as he wishes them to be, is just incoherent – or worse, it is to represent God 
as afflicted with something like schizophrenia.24  
 
Now, an important part of what Hasker says here is simply false.  Hasker says that, on 
theological determinism, there is no possible world God would prefer to the actual world in 
any respect.  But this is false.  God might – and, I think, certainly would – prefer some other 
given possible worlds to the actual world in certain respects.  For instance: God might prefer 
some other possible world in this respect: it doesn’t contain Jones’ lie, whereas this world 
(the actual world) does.  That, God agrees, is a good-making feature of that other world as 
opposed to this one.  What follows instead from theological determinism is simply that there 
is no world that God prefers to the actual world all things considered.  Some other worlds may 
be vastly preferable to the actual world in this respect or other.  It is just that no other world 
is preferable to the actual world in total or in the final analysis. Hasker has simply 
misrepresented the commitments of the theological determinist.   
 The problem of divine “schizophrenia”, then, can be dissolved.  It isn’t as if, at first, 
when God is constructing the story of the world, God has a preference for (or otherwise 
enjoys the thought of) lies, and so includes some lies in the relevant “script” for that reason.  
No.  All along, God does not like (that is, condemns) lies.  But what God also likes – and is 
justified in liking – is an overall excellent script, and God realizes that the best overall script 
will be one that includes some lies; so God includes them.  When those lies in fact come to 
pass, precisely as God determined, no sudden attitude change is required in order for God to 
condemn them: God needn’t go from having preferred or endorsed lying to now condemning 
lying.  God never endorsed lying to begin with, and God has condemned lying all along.  
Importantly: from the mere fact that God has included some lies in the relevant script, it 
does not follow that God approves of (or otherwise endorses) lying.  So it seems that what 
Hasker says could not possibly be could easily be.    
 Hasker, however, is not alone in suspecting that there would have to be a deep 
attitudinal tension in God, according to traditional theological determinism.25 Albert 
Einstein, for instance, once wrote as follows: 
																																																								
24 Hasker, Providence, Evil, and the Openness of God, 160.  
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Nobody, certainly, will deny that the idea of the existence of an omnipotent, just, and 
omnibenevolent personal God is able to accord man solace, help, and guidance… 
But, on the other hand, there are decisive weaknesses attached to this idea in itself, 
which have been painfully felt since the beginning … if this being is omnipotent then 
every occurrence, including every human thought, and every human feeling and 
aspiration, is also his work. How is it possible to think of holding men responsible 
for their deeds and thoughts before such an almighty Being?  In giving out 
punishments and rewards he would be … passing judgment on himself.26  
 
Now, Einstein was, of course, Einstein – but here he can be seen to be making a mistake.  
First, note that Einstein asks what seems to be a reasonable question: in virtue of the fact 
that every human action is determined by God, how could it be reasonable to hold human 
beings responsible?  This is, however, simply the question of the incompatibilist.  (Note, in 
particular, that Einstein does not ask how it is possible for God to hold humans responsible, 
but how this is possible simpliciter.) But even if Einstein’s question is a reasonable one, 
																																																																																																																																																																					
25 Cf. Jerry Walls, One Hell of a Problem for Christian Compatibilists,” 89: “The notion that God is 
angry at sins he himself determines, when he could have determined things otherwise, and then 
pours out his wrath on those same actions is puzzling in the extreme, to say the least.”  Walls here 
seems to be intimating that there is puzzle concerning how the relevant set of divine attitudes is 
coherent or consistent.  It is this complaint that I believe has an adequate answer.  Note: even though 
Walls is an incompatibilist, the implication of this passage does not seem to be simply that it is 
puzzling how God might regard it as fair to blame or punish people for performing actions he 
determined them to perform.  What is puzzling, according to this suggestion, is something like the 
(alleged) attitudinal change that would have to be required in order for God to condemn what he had 
previously determined.  Hasker makes similar points elsewhere in his work, e.g. Providence, Evil, and the 
Openness of God, 133.  
26 Einstein, Out of My Later Years, 26 – 27.  
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Einstein’s further contention seems to be misplaced.  Here Einstein contends that “In giving 
out punishments and rewards he would be … passing judgment on himself.”  But this is 
false.    
 To explain.  Suppose that theological determinism is true, and God criticizes Jones 
for lying.  Is God therefore judging himself for lying?  Of course not; God didn’t lie.  Of 
course, God did bring it about that Jones will lie, but to bring it about that someone will lie is 
not thereby to lie (let alone oneself to perform numerically the same action as the action 
brought about).27  Perhaps, then, the idea is that, if God passes judgment on Jones for lying, 
God would have to pass judgment on himself for bringing it about that Jones lies.  But here we 
must be careful. For whereas God will accept responsibility for bringing it about that Jones lies 
(given theological determinism, this much cannot be denied), God will not – naturally – 
criticize himself for bringing this about.  Indeed, if anything, God will congratulate himself, 
since God recognizes that Jones’s lying (at the relevant time and in the relevant way) is an 
essential part of the overall excellent script the realization of which God is executing. 
Now, some may wish to say that this contention is implausible – that it is implausible 
that a lie would be, in this way, a necessary part of the best (or one of the best…) of all 
possible worlds (or perhaps that, even if it were, God would be permitted to bring it about).  
But here, once more, we simply encounter a different problem: the problem of evil.  The 
important point, at this stage, is the following: there is no reason, given theological 
determinism, that in criticizing Jones for lying, in order to maintain psychological 
consistency, God would also have to be (implausibly) criticizing himself.  For whereas 
creatures do something wrong when they act wrongly, God will maintain that he does not do 
wrong when he acts so as to bring about those wrongs, given their role in the overall fabric 
of reality. At the very least, it is this thesis that Einstein ought to target, if he wants to object 
to traditional theism.  But to target this thesis is to take up the problem of evil; it is to 
challenge the thesis that God could be morally perfect, given that God sometimes 
determines wrongdoing.  The seeming problem of attitudinal consistency – that God would 
be “judging himself” – has disappeared.  
																																																								
27 Cf. Ross, Philosophical Theology, 261: “God does not pick a man’s pocket when I do or help a blind 
man across the street when I do.”  
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But perhaps we should slow down.  For I seem to be saying that there can be no 
moral objection to God’s both determining creatures to perform various wrong actions and 
blaming them for performing those actions, whereas I expect that many readers will suppose 
that there is indeed – there must be! –  available such an objection.  But my point here is not 
that there can be no such moral objection.  My point, instead, is that given compatibilism there 
can be no such objection.   
Paul Russell, himself a naturalist and a compatibilist, however, disagrees.  Russell’s 
position is as follows.  As concerns our own responsibility, there is no morally important 
difference between the deterministic causes of our actions just being there and their instead 
being there as a result of someone’s agency.  Naturalist compatibilists, he thinks, therefore 
must admit that human moral responsibility is – in principle – compatible with the truth of a 
doctrine like theological determinism.28 Now, if you think that this result, in itself, is a bad 
result for compatibilists, then you agree with contemporary incompatibilists who have 
developed so-called “manipulation arguments” for incompatibilism.29 Russell, however, 
wishes to take at least some of the sting out of this result, by claiming that whereas we may 
appropriately blame each other on such a view, God, at any rate, cannot.  As I hope will 
become clear, however, I do not see that Russell has made a good case for this conclusion.  
Russell begins as follows:   
 
We might say that since B controls A’s agency there is insufficient causal distance 
between them to sustain the reactive stance.  Moral communication and 
responsiveness presupposes that agents are not related to each other as controller 
and controlee.  When a controller takes up an evaluative/reactive stance toward an 																																																								
28 As other such philosophers regularly do admit.  See, e.g., Watson, Agency and Answerability, 214 on a 
Leibnizian God, and Wolf, Freedom Within Reason, 103 – 116 on the same.  Neither Watson nor Wolf, 
however, address the question of what attitudes God would or could have towards God’s creatures.   
29 For more on which see, e.g., Kane, The Significance of Free Will, 64 - 78, Pereboom, Free Will, Agency, 
and Meaning in Life, Chapter 4, Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation, Chapter 1, and Todd, “A New 
Approach to Manipulation Arguments,” “Defending (a modified version of) the Zygote Argument,” 
and “Manipulation Arguments and the Freedom to do Otherwise.” 
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agent he controls there is plainly an element of fraud or self-deception going on.  
The controller can only praise or blame himself for the way in which the agent 
succeeds or fails to be guided by available reasons.30   
 
There are least two separate points here.  One point is a point to which we have already 
responded; it is the claim, assessed above, that there is an attitudinal “switch” implied by 
God’s blame which would have to be incoherent or otherwise “fraudulent”. The second 
point, however, is a claim about “causal distance”.  On this score, when I read Russell’s 
claim, I think: “Spoken like a true incompatibilist” – except that Russell is not an 
incompatibilist.  On Russell’s view, even though there is “insufficient causal distance” 
between the controller and the controllee for the controller appropriately to blame, 
nevertheless the controller gives the controlled free will.  It is this that I find puzzling – and 
implausible.  Whereas I can certainly understand the claim that there is indeed insufficient 
causal distance between the relevant parties for blame to be appropriate, this is because I can 
understand the claim that this lack of distance implies (or is constitutive of) the controlled 
agent’s lack of freedom.  But I cannot understand the claim that there is this “lack of 
distance”, when the “controlled” party is indeed free.   
It is worth bringing out here the fundamental weakness of Russell’s compatibilism.  
If, on your view, God might create a community of agents and give them free will (and make 
them fully autonomous and responsible), and yet there is “insufficient causal distance” 
between those creatures and God to license (the in-principle possibility of) God’s holding 
them responsible, then the problem here is not with God; it is with your conception of free 
will and moral responsibility.  It is far more natural to suppose that there would be such 
distance in virtue of God’s making such creatures genuinely free and responsible.  On Russell’s 
view, though God has indeed given the relevant agents free will, there is still a lack of the 
requisite “causal distance”, and so God can only blame himself for how they use it.  This is 
absurd.   
 In this light, consider the ways in which the incompatibilist will simply agree with 
Russell.  Russell writes:  
 																																																								
30 Russell, “Selective Hard Compatibilism,” 159.  
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We may say that when the relationship between two individuals is one involving 
covert control then the participant stance on the side of the controller is compromised.  
The controller is not entitled to take a participant stance in circumstances where he 
decides when reasons, criticisms, and so on succeed or fail to move the agent.31  
 
So far, the incompatibilist agrees: when the controller decides when reasons do or do not 
move the agent, certainly the agent cannot also be responsible for when she is or is not 
moved by such reasons, and in that case the controller certainly will not be “entitled” to 
condemn her for how she is or is not so-moved.  But this is not, of course, the interpretation 
of these facts favored by Russell.  Commenting now on the case at hand, Russell writes:  
 
There is something “absurd” about the suggestion that God holds human beings 
accountable (in a future state) for events that he ordains.32  
 
Once again, the incompatibilist agrees.  There is indeed something absurd about the 
suggestion that God holds human beings to account for events that he ordains, and that is 
precisely the suggestion that those human beings could be responsible for events God ordains.  
However, once more, this is not what Russell means to suggest; Russell contends that 
human beings could be responsible for events God ordains.  Russell goes on:   
 
However, in the absence of any relationship of this kind [controller and controllee] 
the participant stance is not compromised. … What is compromised in these cases is 
not the agent’s responsibility, as such, but the legitimacy of the stance of holding an 
agent responsible on the part of those who covertly control him.33   
 
Russell’s contention, then, is that others may legitimately blame the controlled agent, although 
the controllers themselves cannot.  Russell explains:  
																																																								
31 Russell, “Selective Hard Compatibilism,” 160.  
32 Russell, “Selective Hard Compatibilism,” 161.  
33 Russell, “Selective Hard Compatibilism,” 160.  
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It is indeed illegitimate and inappropriate for God to hold humans accountable in 
these circumstances, insofar as God covertly controls us and all we do.  [However] it 
does not follow from the fact that God is in no position to hold us accountable that 
we are not (fully) accountable to our fellow human beings in these circumstances.34   
 
Russell is right.  It doesn’t directly follow from God’s not being entitled to hold us 
responsible that we simply aren’t responsible.  (This is, indeed, precisely the upshot of the 
literature on moral standing.) The problem is that Russell has not explained why God is not 
entitled to hold us responsible, despite – on his view – making us responsible.  Why does 
God lack such entitlement?  What principle or principles regarding the “moral standing to 
blame” would imply that God is not so-entitled?  So far, all we have is the suggestion that 
there is something “fraudulent” about God’s stance – but we have seen how such an 
objection may be answered.  We are simply left with the mere suggestion that there is 
something “absurd” about God’s holding human beings responsible for events God ordains.  
But whereas there is at hand a ready explanation of this absurdity, this explanation is that of 
the incompatibilist.    
Here, then, we reach the following conclusion: compatibilists ought simply to 
embrace the result that God might have the moral standing to blame those God determines.  
This is, I suggest, the best, and the most principled, compatibilist option available.  Such a 
conclusion, of course, has long since been endorsed by various central philosophical figures 
in western theism – and is sometimes similarly embraced in recent times.  Donald M. 
Mackay, for instance, once wrote:  
 
Insofar as the parallel holds between human and Divine authorship, the foregoing 
[compatibilist] analysis may help to draw the fatalistic sting commonly felt in the 
theological doctrine of predestination; but we may still feel that if God is our 
sovereign Author, we cannot be held really responsible – at least not by Him.35   
 																																																								
34 Russell, “Selective Hard Compatibilism,” 161 – 162.  
35 Mackay, Freedom of Action in a Mechanistic Universe, 33.  
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Mackay, however, ultimately rejects this (he thinks pessimistic) conclusion, writing that  
 
Logically, we can depend for our existence upon the ‘creative’ will of God-in-
eternity, and still be answerable for our response as free beings to the ‘normative’ will 
of God-in-dialogue.36 
 
There are, to be sure, and as Mackay recognizes, still mysteries associated with this doctrine, 
not all of which I have discussed in this essay.  But this doctrine is, I suggest, the most 
attractive position for any compatibilist to take – whether theist or not.  Compatibilists 
should, I submit, be compatibilists all the way through.  If, however, this doctrine is, for you, 
one step too far, then the result is this: for you, compatibilism is one step too far.   
 
Conclusion  
 
It is worth recapping where we’ve been in this paper.  One of the most difficult and 
contentious questions in the history of western theism has always been whether divine 
providence is consistent with creaturely responsibility.  Traditional theists, however, do not 
merely wish to say that we are responsible, but further wish to say that God holds us 
responsible.  But here we encounter deep and difficult questions regarding standing – 
questions that are just beginning to get the attention they deserve.  As I hope this essay has 
made clear, however, the question of God’s standing has not yet received this sort of detailed 
attention. As I see it, the problem of God’s standing deserves explicit recognition as a central 
problem in the philosophy religion.  The problem is not how God could be responsible for 
wrongdoing.  The problem is not how God could be perfect, given the facts of evil. The 
problem is how it could be appropriate for God to blame us, given how intimately involved 
God is in what we do.  Perhaps, the theological determinists may say, ignoring this problem 
																																																								
36 Mackay, Freedom of Action in a Mechanistic Universe, 34. 
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is yet one more mistake which God has determined us to make, but is nevertheless 
disappointed in us for making.  Whatever the case: we should make it no more.37  
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